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AVIAM SOIFER*
It's still the same old story,
A fight for love and glory
A case of do or die....
The fundamental things apply.
As time goes by.
We yearn for blind and disembodied Justice. Yet we also expect and
quietly hope that in the end, in a vital case, a great Justice will let the mask
slip just a bit. We expect the Court to be tough and neutral and above the
fray-but we also want it to come through in the crunch. In other words, we
assign to the court the Bogart role in "Casablanca."
"Casablanca," in fact, illuminates significant issues in contemporary
constitutional theory. Through its flickering light,' it is possible to focus es-
sential problems of discrimination and representation which figure promi-
nently, but are not resolved, in the works of John Hart Ely and Jesse Choper
discussed in this Symposium. The mechanistic treatment of perplexing issues
of democratic theory in City of Mobile v. Bolden2 provides the counterpoint
to three central themes encapsulated in "Casablanca." These three are:
the Ahistorical Stance, the Neutral Pose, and the Dilemma of the Unex-
plained Happy Ending.
There may be bookish souls who stay confined within the four comers of
their constitutional texts and do not get to the movies very often. I will briefly
review "Casablanca" for them. Humphrey Bogart plays Rick, the proprietor
of the Caf6 Amdricain" in Casablanca early in World War II. The plot of the
movie is triggered when a sleazy character named Ugarte, played by Peter
Lorre, entrusts two letters of safe transit to Rick. Rick promptly refuses to
intervene when the Vichy police take Ugarte away to his death. In fact, Rick
appears to be so neutral that he will not intervene for anyone in anything.
The letters of transit in Rick's possession are the only way to escape from
Casablanca for those who lack "money, or influence, or luck."' Otherwise
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.
I. Several confessions are in order here, in the place where it is now de rigueur to include a lengthy list of
acknowledgments. First, one of the places of refuge I found during what some of the faculty believed to be "'the
Dark Ages" at the Yale Law School in the late 1960s and early 1970s was the basement, where the directors of
the Yale Law School Film Society screened films before we showed them. In that dark room, one could not
spend much time reading casebooks. Second, I am married to a documentary filmmaker. Marlene Booth has
helped me to see many things. I also have become acutely aware of how much the camera and the editing
process can create as well as reflect reality.
2. 100 S. Ct. 1490 (1980).
3. H. KOCH, CASABLANCA: SCRIPT AND LEGEND 31 (1973). This thirtieth anniversary volume, put
together by the man who claims main credit for the script of "'Casablanca," is but one of seversl volumes that
reprint the script. For another, replete with scene-by-scene pictures, see R. ANOBILE, CASABLANCA (1974). In
an effort to avoid the bogeyman of a new footnotes-to-page ratio record, I will not (hereinafter) cite specific
quotations from "Casablanca."
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there is no hope, and everyone must "wait, and wait, and wait, and wait..."
since in Casablanca "the Germans have outlawed miracles." Under Vichy,
Casablanca is ruled by the strictest laws of supply and demand; its religion is
the harshest sort of Social Darwinism; it is a market place of everything and
everyone. Except for Rick. Something in Rick's past makes him different-
apparently above it all. He seems not to care about anything, not even about
money. So everybody goes to Rick's place for entertainment, but anybody
who wants results must go to the Blue Parrot to see Ferrari (Sydney Green-
street), who is lord of the black market.
Ilsa, played by Ingrid Bergman, shows up at the Caf6 Amdricain. She is
accompanied by the song, "As Time Goes By," and by Victor Laszlo (Paul
Henreid), a heroic leader of the Resistance. Laszlo needs the letters of transit
if he is to escape Casablanca to carry on the fight againt the Nazis. But Ilsa
and Rick were "romantically involved" in Paris, as the Germans marched in.
The film's central question is whether anyone will get the charmed letters of
transit, and with them a plane ride to Portugal and freedom. Can anything or
anyone pull Rick off his high, neutral barstool? Will he intervene?
I. THE THREE THEMES: MOVIE VERSION
A. The Ahistorical Stance
The romance of the Ahistorical Stance is essential to the way Rick be-
haves in Casablanca. No one knows why Rick lives by his own peculiar rules
nor why he landed in Casablanca. There is reason to doubt his explanation
that he came to Casablanca for the waters.
In a flashback, it becomes clear that the unexplored past was basic to the
way things were when Rick had Paris and Ilsa. In fact Rick could have lost
Ilsa ab initio, as it were, with the following indiscretion:
Rick: Who are you, really? And what were you before? What did you do
and what did you think? Huh?
lisa: We said "no questions."
Rick: Here's looking at you, kid.
Fortunately, Rick's immortal comeback saves the day; love and Paris tri-
umph, to be recaptured somehow in Casablanca. The unexamined past is
what makes Paris worth loving.
B. The Neutral Pose
The Neutral Pose is just that-a pose. No matter how much Rick protests
that he is above or beneath the battle, we suspect-as do the Nazis; the Vichy
police commandant, Captain Renault; and Victor Laszlo-that Rick did not
just happen to fight for the Loyalists in Spain and that he did not run guns to
Ethiopia merely because he was paid. Rick's lapses from neutrality provide
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some of the best moments in the movie. With a nod, Rick allows the band to
play "La Marseillaise" to overwhelm "Deutschland Uber Alles." He si-
lently orders that the roulette game be rigged so that a young woman may
avoid Captain Renault's devilish bargain in exchange for her escape.
All the while, of course, Rick claims-in lines delivered in the best,
gruffest Bogartese-that he has no sympathy for any side. He explains, "I
understand the point of view of the hound" as well as that of the fox. Captain
Renault informs Colonel Strasser, the Nazi commander, "Rick is completely
neutral about everything. And that takes in the field of women, too."
Rick's Ahistorical Stance is somewhat in tension with his Neutral Pose.
Together they are supposed to explain his aggressive isolation from the issues
which surround him. Through them, we are compelled towards the wonder-
ful, Unexplained Happy Ending.
C. The Unexplained Happy Ending
We really never figure out why Victor Laszlo gets both the letters of
transit and Ilsa. In fact, recent scholarship4 discloses that writer, director, and
actors did not know who would be on the plane, even as they filmed "Casa-
blanca." Their uncertainty went so far as to prepare to shoot two different
endings.
We in the audience are content as we leave the theater. But we remain in
the dark about whether Rick finally chooses sides as he does because of his
respect for Laszlo, his belief in Laszlo's cause, his memories of Ilsa as his old
lover, his renewed love for Ilsa, or aspects of all of the above. We do know
that Rick is willing to resort to a noble lie to save Ilsa's honor and to get
Laszlo and Ilsa safely aboard the plane to freedom. But he is also not above
the start of a beautiful friendship with Captain Renault, who advertises him-
self as a man without scruples. We learn that Rick will get involved and that
he does believe in something. Neither the film nor the audience can explain
the happy ending fully. But we know it fits and we are willing to accept a bit of
untidiness.
II. THE THREE THEMES: CONSTITUTIONAL VERSION
City of Mobile v. Bolden is a watershed case. It exemplifies much of
the confusion and complacency in the current Court's approach to basic
issues of constitutional theory. In the course of the six separate opinions
4. H. KOCH, CASABLANCA: SCRIPT AND LEGEND 22-25 (1973) (roughly half the script not written when
shooting began; a dead heat during shooting, with scenes brought to the set the day they were to be shot); I.
BERGMAN & A. BURGESS, INGRID BERGMAN: MY STORY (1980) (two different endings for "Casablanca"
actually to be filmed).
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by the Justices,5 the Ahistorical Stance and the Neutral Pose prevail. But a
majority of the Court scrupulously avoids the dangers of any Happy Ending
which cannot be fully explained.
In Bolden, the Court rejects a claim by black citizens that they are denied
their "constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on an equal
basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction." 6 The plaintiffs in Bolden assert
that the votes of the black citizens of Mobile, who constitute slightly over
one-third of the population of the city, aye diluted unconstitutionally by
Mobile's at-large system of electing the three city commissioners who gov-
ern the city. This claim of discrimination through vote dilution, in an election
scheme established in 1911, was sustained by the district court after lengthy
fact-finding7 and by the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. 8 In companion
5. The Court appears to be continuing its move back toward an earlier tradition of seriatim opinions. In
Bolden, Justice Stewart writes for the plurality, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehn-
quist. Justices Blackmun and Stevens each concur separately. Justices White and Marshall dissent at length.
while Justice Brennan contributes a brief dissent which agrees with parts of each of the opinions of his fellow
dissenters.
6. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972). In San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 441 U.S. I
(1973), Justice Powell for the majority referred to "the protected right, implicit in our constitutional system, to
participate in state elections on an equal basis with other qualified voters whenever the State has adopted an
elective process for determining who will represent any segment of the State's population." Id. at 35 n.78. He
asserted: "[Tihe right to equal treatment in the voting process can no longer be doubted." Id. at 34 n.74. Justice
Stewart, concurring, argued that the Equal Protection Clause creates no substantive rights, with one notable
exception: "the substantive right to participate on an equal basis with other qualified voters whenever the State
has adopted an electoral process for determining who will represent any segment of the State's population." Id.
at 59 n.2.
In Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15,395 U.S. 621,627(1969), Chief Justice Warren summed up
the voting rights ideal of the 1960s; he described the need to abandon traditional deference and to replace it with
careful scrutiny "to determine whether each resident citizen has, as far as is possible, an equal voice" in the
selection of legislators and other public officials.
7. The district court opinion, by Chief Judge Virgil Pittman, is at 423 F. Supp. 384 (S.D. Ala. 1976). This
veteran of fifteen years on the Alabama state court bench made detailed findings to support his general conclu-
sion that: "[The] structure of the at-large election of city commissioners combined with strong racial polariza-
tion of Mobile's electorate continues to effectively discourage qualified black citizens from seeking office or
being elected." Id. at 389. For example, Judge Pittman relied upon regression analysis of election patterns, and
took testimony from "practically all active candidates for public office" to the effect that "it is highly unlikely
that anytime in the foreseeable future, under the at-large system, a black can be elected against a white." Id. at
388. He found "the existence of past discrimination has helped preclude the effective participation of blacks in
the election system today in the at-large system of electing city commissioners." Id. at 393. His other findings
included, "a singular sluggishness and low priority in meeting... particularized black neighborhood needs
when compared with a higher priority of temporary allocation of resources when the white community is
involved." Id. at 392. Chief Judge Pittman emphasized that when the format of election to the Alabama
legislature was changed by court order to single-member districts, it significantly altered a pattern that "when-
ever a redistricting bill of any type is proposed ... a major concern has centered around how many, if any,
blacks would be elected." Id. at 397. The single-member district increased the numbers of blacks in the House
delegation. Chief Judge Pittman found the Washington v. Davis test of discriminatory motive to be met, and
added that the City of Mobile maintained "a political system that grants citizens all procedural rights while
neutralizing their political strength," citing White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973). Id. at 399.
A few of the district court's findings appear forced. Chief Judge Pittman's occasional reference to his
personal views and experience are unusual. But his findings and his opinion reveal careful consideration of a
multitude of local factors. He portrays a local reality of racial polarization and lack of responsiveness to black
citizens, frozen by an electoral system which may have been formally "race-proof" in origin but which has been
intentionally and foreseeably continued to deny "'every citizen ... an inalienable right to full and effective
participation in the political processes,' Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964)." 423 F. Supp. 384, 393
(S.D. Ala. 1976).
8. The Fifth Circuit opinion affirming Chief Judge Pittman's opinion in Bolden is at 571 F.2d 238 (5th Cir.
1978). It is scrupulous in its attention to details of law and fact. That the Fifth Circuit was not engaged in
wild-eyed judicial activism or uncritical solicitude for the claims of all black plaintiffs is obvious throughout the
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cases, the same Fifth Circuit panel reversed or remanded two other district
court holdings which accepted less convincing voting dilution claims.
The essential claim in Bolden is that the racially polarized bloc vot-
ing in Mobile, exacerbated by several elements of the 1911 election format,
freezes black citizens out of the political community. This is compounded by
the fact, as found by the lower courts, that Mobile is unresponsive to the
claims of black citizens for municipal services, employment, and similar ordi-
nary governmental functions. The plaintiffs maintain that they are now, and
long have been, a discrete and insular minority even though they no longer
suffer formal disenfranchisement.
The Bolden decision is startling in part because it does not involve the
traditional problem of who gets included when the Court rounds up the usual
suspects. The Bolden plaintiffs are the archetypal Carolene Products footnote
four 9 "discrete and insular minority." They make the paradigmatic claim
about lack of political access. It is clear from the Court's rejection of their
claim that it is a long way from Memphis to Mobile.'0 Bolden is a dramatic
bookend to the volumes written in pursuit of equal rights in the quarter-
century since Brown v. Board of Education."
In the Bolden plurality opinion, Justice Stewart supplies variations on his
own elaboration of the theme introduced in Washington v. Davis.'2 He further
rigidifies the central role of a strict discriminatory purpose test for fourteenth
and fifteenth amendment analysis.
In Washington v. Davis, the Court determined that discriminatory
motive, which the Court had only recently insisted should not play a signifi-
cant role in equal protection adjudication,"' was to be the necessary condition
opinion, and is confirmed by the same panel's decision to reverse District Judge Pointer in a similar voter
dilution claim from Fairfield. Alabama in Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1978). In both cases, Judge
Tjoflat's opinions were joined by Judge Simpson, and accompanied by vigorous "special concurrences" by
Judge Wisdom. These two cases, as well as the two companion cases, Blacks United for Lasting Leadership,
Inc. v. City of Shreveport, 571 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1978) (district court reversed for inadequate findings to support
decision to uphold vote dilution claim), and Thomasville Branch of N.A.A.C.P. v. Thomas County, Georgia,
571 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1978) (district court reversed, and remanded with instructions that maintenance as well as
origination of districting plan might constitute discriminatory motive), illustrate the Fifth Circuit's conscientious
attempt to apply Washington v. Davis, and the multi-factor test contained in Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d
1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc), affd sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976).
We can tell it is a different constitutional world from what it has been over the past quarter-century when trial
judges and appellate judges in the Fifth Circuit are reversed by the Supreme Court for upholding the claims of
blacks.
9. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
tu. ine citizens of Iennessee who lived ii .,lempnis were among those most grossly affected by the
malapportionment struck down in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). That some Alabama citizens suffered
similarly was made evident in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). See also Watson v. Memphis, 343 U.S. 526
(1963).
II. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Bolden is a particularly useful test of John Ely's representation-reinforcing theory.
It is as if it poses the next problem for Ely. But I will not cite specific points of congruence with Democracy and
Distrust for several reasons. They include: too many footnotes already; a Symposium in which many others
discuss Ely's work with skill and detail; the fact that Ely was generous enough to include me in his Acknowl-
edgements and my belief that a recusal is therefore in order.
12. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
13. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-225 (1971). See Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to
the Problent of Unconstitutional Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REV 95; Ely, Legislative and Adninistratire Motivation
in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970).
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for any equal protection claim. As innovative as its conclusion might have
been, however, Washington v. Davis suggested that discriminatory motive
could be demonstrated in a variety of ways. The thrust of Justice White's
majority opinion was that racial discrimination could be proved through a
totality of the circumstances approach. This appeared to include the naturally
foreseeable consequences of official action, and it allowed consideration of
significant racially disproportionate effects as a starting point. '4 It was on this
basis that the Fifth Circuit specified and followed a multi-factor test for racial
discrimination in the voting dilution context in Bolden.'
5
What Justice Stewart did for the majority in the context of a sex discrimi-
nation claim in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v.,Feeney 6 he does
for the plurality in the racial and voting context in Bolden. Justice Stewart
maintains that discriminatory purpose, which is a necessary predicate, is
demonstrable only through proof that a challenged action was undertaken "at





Justice Stevens pursues several of his personal favorite themes in his
concurring opinion. He argues that a distinction may and should be drawn
between discrimination against individuals qua individuals and discrimination
against individuals as members of groups.18 He asserts further that discrimina-
tory motive is neither necessary nor sufficient to prove an equal protection
violation.' 9
In a brief opinion concurring in the result, Justice Blackmun emphasizes
the remedial problems inherent in the broad scope of the district judge's
restructuring of the city government processes.20
The author of Washington v. Davis, Justice White, dissents vigorously
from the plurality's application of the discriminatory motive test elaborated in
that decision. He emphasizes those sections of his Washington v. Davis
opinion which suggested that discriminatory motive could be proved by in-
14. 426 U.S. 229, 241-42 (1976).
15. The Fifth Circuit's multi-factor approach, based on Washington v. Davis, is most clearly articulated
in Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en bane), affd. sub. nom. East Carroll Parish School
Board v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976).
16. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
17. 100 S. Ct. 1490, 1502-03, n.17 (1980), quoting 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
18. Justice Stevens suggests that "there is a fundamental distinction between state action that inhibits an
individual's right to vote and state action that affects the political strength of various groups that compete for
leadership in a democratically governed community." Id. at 1508. For similar and somewhat strange individual
versus group distinctions by Justice Stevens in both constitutional and statutory contexts, see, e.g., Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 100 S. Ct. 2758, 2803 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The economic consequences of using noble
birth as a basis for classification in 18th century France, though disastrous, were nothing as compared with the
terror that was engendered in the name of *egalite' and 'fraternite.""); Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v.
Manhart, 425 U.S. 702 (1978). But see Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,404-07 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting
with Burger, C. J. and Rehnquist, J.).
19. 100 S. Ct. 1490, 1512 (1980).
20. Id. at 1507-08. That Justice Blackmun's concurrence is dependent upon his sense of remedial over-
reaching is further indicated by his separate concurrence in the per curiam remand of a companion case to
Bolden involving the process of election of the school board in Mobile, Williams v. Brown, 100 S.Ct. 1519
(1980). For further developments in that case, see Moore v. Brown, 101 S. Ct. 16 (1980) (in-chambers opinion)
(Powell, J.).
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ference from the totality of relevant facts. Justice White appears disturbed by
the plurality's decision to reverse the "meticulous factual findings and
scrupulous application of the principles' 21 of the relevant cases by the lower
courts. He also argues that the plurality abandoned the general approach the
Court recently had taken in voting dilution decisions.2
Justice Brennan writes separately, agreeing with Justice White that dis-
criminatory purpose was demonstrated in Bolden and joining Justice Marshall
in arguing that discriminatory purpose should not be a necessary element for
either fourteenth or fifteenth amendment analysis.23
Justice Marshall's dissent nearly bums the pages on which it is written. It
contains the accusation that [i]t is time to realize that manipulating doctrines
and drawing improper distinctions under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, as well as under Congress' remedial legislation enforcing those
Amendments, make this Court an accessory to the perpetuation of racial
discrimination. 2 4
Justice Marshall ends his dissent-released just before the 1980 eruption
of racial violence in Miami-with the warning that a "superficial tranquility"
created by the "impermeable" and "specious" requirement of intentional
discrimination might prove short-lived: "If this Court refuses to honor our
long-recognized principle that the Constitution 'nullifies sophisticated as well
as simple-minded modes of discrimination,' it cannot expect the victims of
discrimination to respect political channels of seeking redress."
'2
It is as if in 1980 black citizens no longer constitute a discrete and insular
minority. A black citizen's constitutional claim will not prevail unless he can
demonstrate precise intentional discrimination against himself as an individ-
ual or some specific and intentional official discriminatory treatment of
blacks. Otherwise, the promise of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments,
and the civil rights revolution, has either been satisfied or is properly left to
the politicians. As we enter the 1980s, it is presumed that we all compete
fairly. When no bad guys can be connected to evil discriminatory deeds, the
Court apparently simply assumes that we all enjoy equal and fair opportunity.
It is forgotten, but not insignificant, that the group that Justice Stone
identified first in his Carolene Products footnote as in need of special judicial
21. Id. at 1514. It must be conceded that Justice White himself has not been entirely consistent in the
application of the kind of wide-ranging inquiry into historical facts and local practices to prove discriminatory
motive which he urges here. For example, Justice White joined the majority in James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137
(1971) and Jefferson v. Hackney. 406 U.S. 535 (1972). In consideration of related matters, he joined in Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion in Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), and he wrote the majority opinion in
O'Shea v. Littleton, 4'14 U.S. 488 (1974). Also revealing is Justice White's narrow view of what would constitute
a legitimate defense to a claim of discriminatory motive in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous.
Dev. Corp.. 429 U.S. 252, 273 (1977)(dissenting to urge remand). Justice White's opinions concerning discrim-
inatory motive in cases which involve racial discrimination claims and the vote do appear internally consistent.
See, e.g. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971). Cf. Beer v. United
States. 425 U.S. 130, 143-45 (1976)(White. J.. dissenting).
22. 100 S. Ct. 1490. 1517-18 (1980). See note 122 infra.
23. 100 S. Ct. 1490. 1520 (1980).
24. Id. at 1540.
25. Id.
1981]
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concern were those persons without sufficient access to "those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesir-
able legislation.,
26
That legislation already on the books might be particularly difficult to
repeal seemed obvious and important in 1938. The Court now appears confi-
dent that, as a constitutional matter, whatever law is in place ought to remain
there. The only exception seems to be for cases which involve overwhelming
demonstration of the most blatant form of discriminatory motive. Political
reality, believed to be biased or excessively difficult to change four decades
ago, is now presumed to be fair. Racial minorities burdened by "undesirable
legislation" must seek its repeal without judicial assistance.
What brought about this change? The unarticulated source of this altered
constitutional consciousness is probably the Voting Rights Act of 1965.27
Goaded by the civil rights movement, by dramatic events in Selma, Alabama,
and by Lyndon Johnson at his most persuasive,28 Congress determined that
pervasive disenfranchisement of blacks had gone on too long. Congress there-
fore invoked its power under the enforcement clauses of the fourteenth and
fifteenth amendments to pass a Voting Rights Act which compelled sweeping
reform of much of the existing electoral system. The 1965 Act depended upon
extensive federal scrutiny to ensure local and state compliance.
Congress nowhere indicated that it believed its voting rights legislation
superseded or preempted the constitutional protection of the right to vote. A
burning constitutional question at the time concerned the scope of Congress'
enforcement power. It is ironic that the Court's emphatic, repeated approval
of broad congressional power-9 is transformed somehow into an apparent
constitutional belief that congressional action is the exclusive resort, and a
sufficient answer, for those who claim systemic problems within the existing
political system. It is tragic if the Court believes that the goals of the Voting
Rights Act, or the constitutional ideals which were its basis, already have
been realized.
The Court does not have the relatively easy statutory escape route in
Bolden that it employs in the companion case of City of Rome v. United
States.30 City of Rome appears to illustrate Jesse Choper's approach, in which
the Court views Congress as an adequate clearinghouse for claims of the
states. The Court then, in effect, can explain, "Those devils in Congress and
26. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (emphasis added).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1976). It has been suggested by Senator Strom Thurmond (R.-S.C.), who is about to
be the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, that the Voting Rights Act should be repealed. Thurmond
told a reporter, "I think the states ought to pass their own laws." Boston Globe, November 17. 1930, at 10, col.
I.
28. See S. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS 288-328 (1976); D. KEARNS, LYNDON JOHNSON AND THE
AMERICAN DREAM 228-30, 304-08 (1976); M. MILLER, LYNDON 331 (1980).
29. See, e.g. United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445
(1976); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). But see
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
30. 100 S. Ct. 1548 (1980).
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the Department of Justice made us do it." The Justices are able to invoke this
defensive posture in City of Rome even as they engage in rather strained and
expansive interpretation of congressional language.
In Bolden, however, none of the Justices chooses to debate or to elabo-
rate upon the claim made by Justice Stewart, in his plurality opinion, that
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is a redundant appendage to the fifteenth
amendment. The fifteenth amendment, in turn, is said to contain only a
"command and effect [which] are wholly negative." 3' Justice Stewart then
reaches out to determine that the constitutional requirement of proof of pur-
poseful discriminatory motivation applies to the fifteenth as well as to the
fourteenth amendment. What his approach does to the fifteenth amendment is
something akin to what Justice Miller did to the privileges or immunities
clause of the fourteenth amendment in the Slaughter-House Cases.3" The
fifteenth amendment becomes surplusage; it is this court's variation on the
theme of constitutional text as "but a truism.""
It is the plurality opinion by Justice Stewart which best serves to illus-
trate the connection of "Casablanca" to constitutional law. Justices Stewart
and Stevens recently have been the primary proponents of a constitutional
theory which commands general governmental neutrality. The duty of gov-
ernment to be neutral is thought to co-exist with a hands-off policy of judicial
neutrality,34 apparently constitutionally compelled. In his plurality opinion in
31. 100 S. Ct. 1490, 1497 (1980). Justice Stewart's interpretation of the fifteenth amendment and of statutes
based upon it piles redundancy upon redundancy. He determines that it is unnecessary to consider the statutory
claims made by the plaintiffs-but not adequately dealt with by the lower courts--because "it is apparent that
the language of § 2 [of the Voting Rights Act of 19651 no more than elaborates upon that of the Fifteenth
Amendment, and the sparse legislative history of § 2 makes clear that it was intended to have an effect no
different from that of the Fifteenth Amendment itself. " Id. at 1496. To support this decision to proceed directly
to the constitutional issue without full consideration of statutory claims, Justice Stewart cites Senator Dirksen,
who said that Section 2 was "'almost a rephrasing of the Fifteenth Amendment." Id. at 1496-97. This
statement by Dirksen does not seem to be the same as the view that "this section simply restated the prohibi-
tions already contained in the Fifteenth Amendment." Id. at 1496. Almost isn't good enough. This is particularly
so in the context of a double redundancy inherent in Justice Stewart's statutory interpretation. A lonely remnant
of the Reconstruction era statutes was, and still is, on the books as 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (a), and does the same thing
once more. Even if Congress were simply repeating an old statute and the fifteenth amendment, the repetition
itself should have significance rather than being glibly dismissed-
Judge Wisdom's extensive discussion of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 in his special concur-
rence in Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 237-38 (5th Cir. 1978), appears far more convincing than the snippet from
"Old Ev" Dirksen, which constitutes the entire reference to legislative intent in the plurality opinion.
The interpretation the plurality goes on to give the fifteenth amendment itself makes that entire amendment
appear to be otiose in the context of the fourteenth amendment. See text accompanying notes 117 23, infroa.
32. 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 36, 74 (1873).
33. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (description of tenth amendment). That a mere
"truism" can be resuscitated quickly, and with potency. is revealed in the recent use of the tenth amendment. In
1975, while still a truism, that amendment was "not without significance." United States v. Fry, 421 U.S. 542,
547 n.7 (1975). A year later it appears to have been the basis forNational League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976).
Justice Marshall carefully notes in his Bolden dissent that only the four Justices in the plurality agree that
the discriminatory motive test is properly applied to the fifteenth amendment. 100 S. Ct. 1490. 1531 n.24 (1980).
Perhaps the fifteenth amendment will enjoy a revival similar to that of the tenth amendment. See text ac-
companying notes 116-118 infra.
34. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutzmick, 100 S_ Ct. 2758, 2798 (1980)(Stewart, J., dissenting with Rehnquist, J-)
("[T]he Constitution is wholly neutral in forbidding racial discrimination."); Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442
U.S. 256, 274-79 (1979)(Stewart, J.)(abolute preference for veterans valid since not "inherently non-neutral");
New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 (1979)(Stevens, J.)(fundamental principle of equal
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Bolden, Justice Stewart has the opportunity to merge the Ahistorical Stance
and the Neutral Pose. He does so with devastating effect.
The point of the comparison of the Court's reasoning in Bolden to themes
in "Casablanca" is not to suggest that Bolden is an easy case. 5 Our constitu-
tional system has not resolved central issues of what exactly is meant by "a
substantive right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other quali-
fied voters. -36 We tend to depend upon that very lack of resolution when we
start thumping the tub about equal opportunity. We also lack any principled
answer to the dilemma of where on a continuum from virtual representation to
actual representation we believe our representatives should be.37
Jesse Choper makes a substantial contribution to our practical under-
standing of virtual representation in the context of federalism and judicial
review. John Ely offers a powerful theoretical treatment of the evolution of a
constitutional approach toward actual representation. Neither scholar pur-
ports to resolve all the basic problems of democratic theory he addresses,
however, and it is no surprise that the court has trouble with such issues
posed in a case such as Bolden. Bolden affords "the teachers in a great
national seminar ' 38 a tricky pop quiz about the appropriate direction for our
system of democracy and our theory of representation. But the exam is in
essay form, and the Court fails. It fails not so much for the answer it gives, as
for the way it answers.
Justice Stewart's plurality opinion may be a mask for Our Federalism
Redux.3 9 It may be an indication of judicial restraint premised on judicial
protection uat State govern impartially); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 67 (1976)
(Stevens, J.)("absolute neutrality" the essence of first amendment rule which prohibits regulation of communi-
cation by content).
35. The concept of equal voting rights is not self-defining, as the White Primary Cases make clear. The
problem of how to tell when a racial minority is frozen out of the political process to the extent that we can
properly identify a constitutional violation is not simple. See section II, (C) infra. By no means do I intend to
suggest that the problem of long-term institutional bias and dilution of the minority vote is unique to Mobile. to
Alabama or to the South. It would be foolhardy for anyone who has spent time in Boston to make such a claim.
The recent troubled history of Boston's public schools is but the most vivid reminder that blacks often lack
political clout in the urban North and that at-large election systems exist and harm blacks there, too. See Owen
v. School Committee of Boston, 304 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Mass. 1969)(unsuccessful challenge to at-large School
Committee election scheme in Boston); Black Voters v. McDonough, 421 F. Supp. 165 (D. Mass. 1976). affd
565 F.2d I (lst Cir. 1977) (similar attack on same system rejected; although "close question" and remand for
continuing jurisdiction); See also S. SCHULTZ, THE CULTURE FACTORY: BOSTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS 1789-1860
(1973); Fox, Discrimination and Antidiscrimination in Massachusetts Law, 44 B.U. L. REV. 30 (1964).
For a finding of public school segregation in Boston by the purposeful actions of the School Committee. see
Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410, 484 (D. Mass.). affd. sub nom. Morgan v. Kerrigan. 509 F.2d 580 (Ist
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975). See also District Attorney v. Watson, - Mass. -. , Mass. Adv.
Sh. 2231, 2252-53 (1980) (invalidation of the death penalty, including observation that racial discrimination is not
confined to the South or any other region and that "the existence of racial prejudice in some persons in the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts is a fact of which we take notice,") (majority opinion by Hennessey. C. J.).
36. San Antonio School Ind. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 59 n.2 (1973)(Stewart. J., concurring).
37. See generally J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 77-104 (1980); H. PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF
REPRESENTATION (1967). See also Greenberg, Representation and the Isolation of South Carolina. 1776-
1860," 64 J. AM. HIST 723 (1977).
38. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REV. 193, 203 (1952).
39. For the evolution of Our Federalism as something of a meta-constitutional concept, see Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). and its multiple progeny, discussed in Soifer & Macgill, The Younger Doctrine:
Reconstructing Reconstruction, 55 TEX. L. REV. 1141 (1977). Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Stewart.
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uncertainty. It was not long ago, however, that the Court recognized that
case-by-case proof of discrimination was difficult if not impossible in the
electoral context. It seemed obvious in 1966 that "an insidious and pervasive
evil" had long skewed the democratic process. 40 For the 1980 Court, Wash-
ington v. Davis seems to be the beginning of history. The discovery of "the
basic principle that only if there is purposeful discrimination can there be a
violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment' At has
become the source of analysis of all claims of inequality, except for school
desegregation, for which the clock apparently can be turned back to 1954.42
Insulation from harsh historical realities now is combined with manipulation
of single-causation analysis. This technique carries its practitioners far be-
yond what otherwise might be merely a mistaken but defensible result in a
difficult case.
What is noteworthy about the plurality opinion, joined by that of Justice
Stevens, is the suggestion of extreme deference to the status quo as the basic
constitutional value in the coming decade. The powers that be will remain.
Proof that some official is way out of bounds, and intentionally so at that, is
required to get the attention of the Court.
A. The Ahistorical Stance
Oh, Mama, can this really be the end?
To be stuck inside of Mobile
With the Memphis blues again.43
No better illustration of the limited logic of the law is likely to be found
than Justice Stewart's use of historical syllogisms in Bolden. They are breath-
taking; they are Dada.
Determination of the appropriate weight to be assigned to our history of
past racial discrimination is admittedly a difficult task. Comparison to Justice
Holmes' skeptical view of the utility of history is revealing. Not even Holmes
could make clear how long the "experience" he celebrated as essential had to
age before it became the derelict dragon of "tradition. '" 44 Nor did Holmes
explain fully why experience but not tradition was useful for predicting what a
judge actually would do.
Possibly Holmes meant merely to distinguish between the grand tradition
of legal history writing, which he thought pernicious, and the pioneering
certainly indicates constitutional doubts about federal regulation of state elections in his dissent in City of Rome
v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1548, 1577-85 (1980). Justice Powell expresses similar doubts, albeit to a more
limited extent. Id. at 1574-77.
40. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966).
41. 100 S. Ct. 1490, 1499 (1980).
42. See e.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443
U.S. 526 (1979).
43. B. Dylan, "'Memphis Blues Again." Blonde on Blonde Album.
44. See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
45. Id. at 458, 461.
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social sciences of his time, for which.he had high hopes. More sober reflection
led Holmes, as it leads most of us, to be less optimistic about law and about
teleological notions generally. 46 Yet Holmes kept battling even when his
doubt was profound. He believed history essential to discover how law comes
to be what it is. 47
By way of contrast, Justice Stewart appears not to have noted the diffi-
culties. He neither doubts nor does battle. Instead, he embraces the Ahistori-
cal Stance, in all its sterility, with an enthusiasm which is chilling. For ex-
ample:
(1) In 1911, Mobile enacted an at-large voting pattern, which was part of
a nationwide campaign against corruption in city government, and which
is a pattern still employed "by literally thousands of municipalities and
other local governmental units throughout the Nation." 4
(2) In 1911, blacks did not vote in Alabama.
• The 1911 voting reform could not have been intended to discriminate
on the basis of race.
If 1911 in isolation is the relevant slice of time, and if overt racially
discriminatory intention on the part of the enactors of the electoral scheme is
the key to any violation of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendments, Justice
Stewart's logic is impeccable.
The answer to the historical disenfranchisement of the plaintiffs, and to
the findings of intentional discrimination by lower court judges who are all too
familiar with the history of racial discrimination in Alabama, is as follows:
But past discrimination cannot, in the manner of original sin, condemn govern-
mental action that is not itself unlawful. The ultimate question remains whether a
discriminatory intent has been proven in a given case. 49
Like original intent, 50 even the original sin of racial discrimination is not
what it once was in constitutional law. Racial discrimination in voting is
probably as close to original constitutional sin as we now get.5'
The notion that it should be constitutionally decisive that the 1911
scheme was technically, formally neutral as to race is not convincing. It is a
version of neutrality akin to America's neutrality in the period of lend-lease
46. See, e.g., Hamilton, On Dating Mr. Justice Holmes, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. I, 10, 15, 26-9 (1941); Rogat,
Mr. Justice Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion, 15 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1962) and 15 STAN. L. REV. 254 (1963).
47. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 476 (1897). Holmes' continued belief in the
importance of ideas despite his prized detachment, and his ambivalence about the proper uses of history, are
reminiscent of Isaiah Berlin's elegant description of similar tensions in Tolstoy's thought. See The Hedgehog
and the Fox, in I. BERLIN, RUSSIAN THINKERS 22-81 (1978).
48. 100 S. Ct. 1490, 1496 (1980). See also id. at 1502 n.17.
49. Id. at 1503 (emphasis added).
50. Compare, e.g., Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204
(1980) with Monaghan, The Constitution Goes to Harvard, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 117 (1978).
51. It is important not to revere the Framers' original intent to such an extent that we overlook the role
played by the serpent of slavery in their Edenic structure.
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prior to World War II. It is reminiscent of the ahistorical view, as it was
deployed in defense of the doctrine of separate but equal. To consider the
motivation of 1911 in isolation is to ignore the entire history of overt racial
discrimination in voting, and nearly everything else, which produced and
perpetuated the disenfranchisement of blacks before, during, and long after
the 1911 slice-of-time.
One is reminded of the answer given by Charles Black to the claim that
separate could be equal and that educational issues should be left to local
authorities. Black's response rested "on the ground of history and of common
knowledge about the facts of life."-12 We also "ought to exercise one of
the sovereign prerogatives of philosophers, that of laughter"53 in reaction to
the notion that Mobile's electoral scheme and political reality were neutral as
to race in 1911, or that they somehow, at sometime, have become neutral
since.
Justice Stewart's need to avoid condemnation of virtually all govern-
mental action-since past racial discrimination taints the entire structure of
our political and judicial systems-leads him to create an ultimate constitu-
tional test which will reach virtually no discrimination. The evil eye which
produces discrimination despite facial neutrality is generally less obvious and
less potent today than it appeared to be in the nineteenth century; our officials
have become more skilled at tailoring velvet gloves to hide uneven hands.,4
Instead of allowing trial courts to probe sophisticated forms of discriminatory
motive, Justice Stewart creates a constitutional test which vigorously pre-
sumes good faith while it simultaneously assumes away history. Unless and
until some public official slips badly and discloses an affirmative plot to dis-
criminate, inertia appears adequate to purge past wrongs.
[W]here the character of a law is readily explainable on grounds apart from race,
as would nearly always be true where, as here, an entire system of local gov-
ernance is brought into question, disproportionate impact alone cannot be de-
cisive, and courts must look to other evidence to support a finding of discrimina-
tory purpose. 55
52. Black, The Laifitbiess of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 424 (1960).
53. Id. at 427.
54. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886). ("Though the law itself be fair on its face and
impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal
hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances,
material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution.")
55. 100 S. Ct. 1490, 1501 (1980). The lower courts are scolded for their consideration of "other evidence"
which did not specifically identify the state officials who were the perpetrators of discriminatory actions against
the plaintiffs. Id. at 1503 n.20. It is somewhat ironic that in the most recent major school desegregation
decisions, Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979) and Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443
U.S. 526 (1979), it was Justice Stewart, joined by Chief Justice Burger, who emphasized "undiminished
deference to the factual adjudication of the federal trial judges in cases such as these (desegregation suits],
uniquely situated as those judges are to appraise the societal forces at work in the community where they sit."
Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick. 443 U.S. 449, 470 (1979)(separate opinion). But Justice Stewart does appear
consistent in that opinion when he rejects the significance of the role of past discrimination in shaping current
realities. Id. at 472-73.
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Continuing effects of past racial discrimination will not suffice. Current pat-
terns of racial inequality, resting on the bedrock of past discriminatory prac-
56tice, are not enough. That blacks in Mobile always have been defeated for
office "does not work a constitutional deprivation.- 57 The existence of dis-
crimination in municipal services and employment may be acknowledged, but
a constitutional remedy may come only in separate lawsuits. The current
Court repeatedly has held that even proof of systemic failure does not trans-
late into constitutional violations. 58 Though Mobile's at-large system was
found to disadvantage blacks, and to have been continued despite awareness
of that fact, such factors are not included in the Court's constitutional calibra-
tion so long as other minorities are also disadvantaged. The plurality believes
that "[tlo hold otherwise would be to constitutionalize a theory of proportion-
ate representation, which could not be easily cabined."'5 9
The plurality's suggested choice between the claims of Mobile's black
citizens and the theory of proportional representation presents a false dicho-
tomy. The plaintiffs attack their continued exclusion from the levers of mu-
nicipal power, based upon a system which excluded blacks entirely for
decades. They object to practices found by lower courts to have been main-
tained despite obvious racially discriminatory impact. These black citizens do
not claim an abstract right to proportional representation. Instead, their con-
stitutional argument is directed against a political system which was based
upon total racial exclusion, which has not been changed to ameliorate old pat-
terns, and which still evidences consciousness of color and disregard for the
concerns of black citizens. To exercise judicial deference to this particular
form of realpolitik is to blame the victims of past wrongs, and to condone the
current manifestations of past discrimination.
It is true that the problem of how long the sins of the past should carry a
constitutional taint remains a profoundly difficult problem in constitutional
theory. The very complexity of the inquiry involved helps to explain the
56. Justice Stewart uses a strategy of separating, and then minimizing, the aggregate factors found to prove
discriminatory purpose in the lower courts. Justice White attacks the plurality's use of the technique:
By viewing each of the factors relied upon below in isolation, and ignoring the fact that racial bloc voting at
the polls makes it impossible to elect a black commissioner under the at-large system, the plurality rejects
the "totality of the circumstances" approach we endorsed in White v. Regester, Washington v. Davis and
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., and leaves the courts below
adrift on uncharted seas with respect to how to proceed on remand.
100 S. Ct. 1519 (1980)(White, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). This approach to the facts in the vote dilution
context is similar to the Court's isolate-and-overcome approach to the law in a claim of total exclusion from the
vote concerning the police power in Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60. 69-71 (1978).
57. 100 S. Ct. 1490, 1503 (1980).
58. Id. See, e.g.. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974). See note 39
supra.
59. 100 S. Ct. 1490, 1506 n.26 (1980). One wonders whether the ironic echo of Archibald Cox-"Once
loosed, the idea of Equality is not easily cabined," in Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the
Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV..L. REV. 91 (1966)--is intentional or not. Similarly, one must ponder the
assertion by the plurality that - 'historical and social factors' indicating that the group in question is without
political influence" are "gauzy sociological considerations [which] have no constitutional basis." 100 S. Ct.
1490, 1504 n.22 (1980). What does this tell us about the current Court's view of the twentieth century's second
most famous legal footnote, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.l 1(1954)?
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analytic disaster of school desegregation decisions over the past decade,
culminating in the artificiality of the majority opinions in Columbus Board of
Education v. Penick6° and Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman.6, School
desegregation cases seem to be sui generis. Education is the single realm in
which the Court is still willing to concede that general past wrongs have not
been righted by the passage of time and the absence of overwhelming proof of
current, specific discriminatory motive.
Once in place, however, virtually any electoral system is defensible on all
sorts of rational grounds. We are all familiar with permutations and combina-
tions of defenses that include "the people's choice," "the legislature's acquies-
cence," "local control," "settled expectations," and the like. Further, there
are the familiar and important institutional doubts about the nondemocratic
and unaccountable character of judicial intervention. Finally, we know by
now that the political thicket can become a slough62 and even a tarpit.
Simple reliance on rationality in the Ahistorical Stance was captured by
the late film director, Jean Renoir, who said, "You see, in this world, there is
one awful thing, and that is that everyone has his reasons." 63
Even defenders of slavery might have survived the ahistorical version of
the discriminatory motive test. Initial justifications for slavery did not depend
on race, and the defenders of slavery continued to justify it on grounds be-
yond or in addition to racial discrimination. Many of them seem to have
believed those rationalizations. They thought their system provided the great-
est good for the greatest number, and they claimed to be far more protective
of the least-well-off members of society than was the system of wage slavery
in the North. 4 The defenders of school segregation similarly convinced
themselves and others that separate schooling was better schooling for all.
For a long time it was widely assumed that the system of segregated schools
was not based upon a racially discriminatory purpose.65
60. 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
61. 443 U.S. 526 (1979).
62. This was Justice White's variation on Justice Frankfurter's theme in Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S.
735. 750-51 (1973).
63. From "The Rules of Game" quoted in Renoir obituary. N.Y. Times, February 14, 1979, at D-19, col. I.
64. See, e.g., J. ROARK. MASTERS WITHOUT SLAVES 72-74 (1977); W. TAYLOR, CAVALIER & YANKEE
145-224, 261-324 (1%1); L. HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA 145-201 (1955); Donald, The
Proslarery Argunent Reconsidered 37 J. SO. HIST. 3 (1971); Greenberg, Revolutionary Ideology and the
Proslarery Argument: The Abolition of Slarery in Antebellum South Carolina, 42 J. SO. HIST. 365 (1976). See
generally the work of Eugene Genovese and David Brion Davis.
65. See generally R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1975). The Court in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896), delighted to rely upon the other than racially discriminatory basis found and sustained by the great Chief
Justice Lemuel Shaw in Roberts v. City of Boston, 5 Cush. 198 (Mass. 1850). The Court in Plessy noted that the
attack on separate-but-equal schooling was rejected "even by courts of States where the political rights of the
colored race have been longest and most earnestly enforced." 163 U.S. 537.544(18%). See L. LEVY, THE LAW
OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW 109-118 (1957). In Cumming v. Richmond County Bd.
of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899), Justice Harlan, writing for a unanimous Court, found no constitutional right
violated when Augusta, Georgia closed its highly successful black high school. The Court accepted the argu-
ment that the matter was properly left to local control, so long as there was a rational basis for the school
closing. Because the newly disenfranchised black population lacked sufficient clout, they and the Supreme
Court were faced with an argument that the closing of the black high school, but not the white high school, was
necessary to keep black elementary schools open. It was claimed that the closing actually served "the greatest
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The Court itself discovered a host of good reasons not to intervene in
challenges to the initial Southern disenfranchisement of black citizens be-
tween 1890 and 1910. During the period when Alabama, along with other
Southern states, set about to deprive blacks of the vote they had gained during
Reconstruction and "created the system of segregation and disenfranchise-
ment, "66 the Court found it important to defer to the local authorities. Justice
Holmes led the way.67 Black plaintiffs were remanded to the popular will in
their states or to the discretion of Congress and the Executive. The Court
played a prominent role in the creation of the disenfranchisement system
through its early complicity with new legal restrictions on the franchise. As
Professor J. Morgan Kousser put it in his description of the "Reactionary
Revolution" of disenfranchisement:
[F]olkways became stateways, with all the psychological power of legality and the
social power of enforceability now behind them .... After the revolutionary
Southern legal changes, the segregated and disfranchised retained no hope and no
allies. Most, at that time, were excluded from the suffrage by the enforcement, not
the nonenforcement of the laws. 68
The entire electoral "reform" of disenfranchisement was not defended in
terms of discrimination. Rather it was claimed to be a way to ensure "the
supremacy of virtue and intelligence" in the electorate, and was applauded as
"a typically Progressive reform." 69 The legislation which permitted the altera-
tion of city governance and elections in Alabama in 1911 was the culmination
of the movement away from corrupt elections and towards what was thought
to be cleaner, better politics. 70 Some whites, as well as virtually all black
citizens, were the victims.
good for the greatest number. " Augusta Chronicle, March 25, 1898, quoted in Kousser, Separate but not Equal:
The Supreme Court's First Decision on Racial Discrimination in Schools, 46 J. SO. HIST. 17, 32 (1980). The
lawyers for the school board argued that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to demonstrate bad faith, id. at 37,
and Justice Harlan and the unanimous Court agreed, 175 U.S. 528, 544-45 (1899).
66. S. HACKNEY, POPULISM TO PROGRESSIVISM IN ALABAMA xiii (1969). See generally C. WOOD-
WARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (2nd rev. ed., 1966).
67. See Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903). The newly-arrived Justice from Massachusetts concentrated
upon the enforcement problems of a decision that the Alabama Constitution of 1901 violated the federal
constitution in its disenfranchisement of blacks. Because the claim was that "the great mass of the white
population intends to keep the blacks from voting," id. at 488, the Court could not be of assistance since equity
could provide no remedy, "[u]nless we are prepared to supervise the voting in that State by officers of the
court." The plaintiffs were instructed that "relief from a great political wrong, ifdone .. must be given by [the
people of the State] or by the legislative and political department of the government of the United States." Id.
Holmes also discussed general limits on the Court's equity powers. See also Giles v. Teasley, 193 U.S. 146
(1904); Jones v. Montague, 194 U.S. 147 (1904).
In light of this history, Justice White appears to overstate when he asserts, "The absence of official
obstacles to registration, voting, and running for office heretofore has never been deemed to insulate an electoral
system from attack under the Fourteenth Amendment." 100 S. Ct. 1490, 1518 (1980). The Court did recall Giles
v. Harris for its restrictive view of equity power in Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378 (1976).
68. J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS, 1880-1910 262-64 (1974).
69. Id. at 265, quoting John B. Knox, the president of the 1901 Alabama Constitutional Convention,
260.
70. The scope of the change is lucidly demonstrated in a study of Birmingham, Alabarha by C. V. HARRIS,
POLITICAL POWER IN BIRMINGHAM, 1871-1921 56-58 (1977). Harris finds that in the 1870s, approximately 30
percent of the registered voters in Birmingham city elections were black; and in the 1880s, from 45 to 48 percent.
The response was an all-white city primary in 1888, and a drive to disenfranchise which achieved virtually total
success with the new 1901 Alabama Constitution. The city elections thereafter were concerned primarily with
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It took a more legally realistic Court to recognize the insidious nature of
good reasons-such as protection of veterans, and those with settled expec-
tations, and those willing to put their money where their political interest
was-and to invalidate the discretionary tests harshly administered to dis-
enfranchise blacks and the nonconformist poor. That blacks were technically
free to vote in regular elections was not thought to be an adequate constitu-
tional defense in the White Primary Cases,7' even when associations which
claimed to be private asserted their own constitutional rights in the process of
the exclusion of blacks from political power.
We have begun to hear disturbing echoes of the Court of a century ago.
Again it has been judicially determined that it is time that blacks ceased to be
special favorites of the law.72 Once more we are told that blacks are perfectly
capable of competing equally with their fellow citizens. 7' The country again
seems tired of stories about past discrimination as it did a decade after the
Civil War. 74 In the absence of personal feelings of guilt, there is a search for
a return to normalcy. Tales of past discrimination sound as worn as the story
of original sin. No one is to blame. Only when the Court is convinced by clear
proof that an individual was discriminated against on the basis of race will it
intervene. 75 The Constitution embraces faith in the fairness of our institutions,
and the Court will not go behind that pleasing presumption. With resonance
from the Court of the Gilded Age of the 1880s, the current Court reflects the
Guilt-Free Age of the 1980s.
It would be most pleasant if we could ignore our own sins, to say nothing
of the sins of our fathers and mothers. As we tend our gardens and enjoy our
cafes, it would be comforting if we could know the law without looking
backward. But past presences do intrude. Ilsa does get to Casablanca, and
annexation, corruption, and prohibition of secular activities of all sorts. The change from an aldermanic to a city
commissioner form of government, contemporaneous with the 1911 election change in Montgomery, was
instituted and applauded as an "advanced step" in urban reform. Id. at 33. But Harris summarizes, "'Mhe
central thrust of several reforms was to place the blacks more firmly and efficiently under the discipline of
economically-powerful white groups."Id at 279.
71. The Court's invocation of the Constitution to move away from the technicalities and aggressive judicial
restraints which shackled black voting in the cases discussed in note 67 supra, began in Guinn v. United States,
238 U.S. 347 (1915), and prevailed through Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953). Justice Black's majority
opinion in Terry v. Adams held, "It violates the Fifteenth Amendment for a state ... to permit within its
borders the use of any device that produces an equivalent of the [racially discriminatory] election." Id. at 469. In
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664 (1944), the Court held that a state "endorses, adopts and enforces"
discrimination in the vote by failing to regulate against it. See also Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663 (1966).
72. Justice Bradley's words in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883), were "When a man has
emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficient legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of
that state, there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and
ceases to be the special favorite of the laws." In 1978, Justice Powell's decisive opinion in Regents of the Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), noted: "It is far too late to argue that the guarantee of equal protection to
all persons permits the recognition of special wards entitled to a degree of protection greater than that accorded
others." Id. at 295 (emphasis in original).
73. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 100 S. Ct. 2758, 2809 (1980)(Stevens, J., dissenting) (noted ever
increasing demonstrations "that members of disadvantaged races are entirely capable not merely of competing
on an equal basis, but also of excelling in the most demanding professions.")
74. See generally W. GILLETE, RETREAT FROM RECONSTRUCTION-1869-1879 (1979).
75. For an enlightening discussion, see Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidis-
crimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Decisions, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978).
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Rick laments, "Of all the gin joints in all the towns in all the world, she walks
into mine!"
The Ahistorical Stance lacks adequate foundation. Perhaps we do learn
from our past mistakes. But it begins to seem that, at least in the context of
racial discrimination and access to the levers of power in our society, we grow
able to repeat our mistakes unerringly. This is surely history as tragic farce.
B. The Neutral Pose
They say in Harlan County
There are no neutrals there.
You either walk the picket line
Or you scab for J. H. Blair.
Which side are you on, boys,
Which side are you on?76
The constitutional search for discriminatory motive is a search for vil-
lains. When historical patterns are no longer relevant, the individual plaintiff
must prove that a bad thing was done for a bad reason. Otherwise the Court
will leave well enough alone. Unless it is convinced by proof far stronger than
the standard of causation generally used in the common law,"n the Court will
presume that even unprincipled governmental officials are neutrals, entitled
to judicial deference.
That assumption may make some sense in such areas as the never-
neverland of standardized testing and job qualifications for public employ-
ment, for example.78 As the test was first articulated in Washington v. Davis,
discriminatory motive "may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant
facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more heavily on one
race than another.",79 By the time the discriminatory motive test reached the
suburbs of Chicago, however, a numerical demonstration0 which appeared to
be in the same ballpark with the classics of uncouth discriminatory motive,
Yick Wo v. Hopkins8 ' and Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 2 did not suffice. The Court
nevertheless continued to claim that a set of figures that constituted a shock to
the neutral judicial conscience would be sufficient.
76. Old union song.
77. See, e.g., HART & HONORE, CAUSATION AND THE LAW (1959); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS § 42 (4th ed. 1971); Pound, Causation, 67 YALE L.J. 1 (1957).
78. See, e.g., The Guardians Ass'n of the New York City Police Dep't, Inc. v. Civil Service Comm'n, No.
80-7027 (2d Cir. July 31, 1980).
79. 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
80. In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-66 (1977). Justice
Powell's majority opinion reaffirmed Washington v. Davis, while noting that a stark pattern might suffice to
invalidate legislation which appears neutral on its face. A village with 64,000 residents, of whom 27 were blacks.
was not such a stark pattern. Id. at 255.
81. 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (320 laundries, of which approximately 310 were constructed of wood; 75 pecent
had Chinese owners. Over 150 of the 240 Chinese owners arrested; none of the approximately 80 remaining
white owners of wooden laundries arrested.)
82. 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960) (uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure was "'tantamount ... to a mathematical
demonstration" that the Alabama law redefining boundaries of Tuskegee was "'solely concerned with segregat-
ing white and colored voters by fencing Negro citizens out of town.") For a discussion of the relative appeal of
fourteenth and fifteenth amendment motive analysis in this context, see Ely, Legislative and Administrative
Motivation iii Constitutional Lai', 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1222-24 (1970).
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The constitutional test changed drastically in Personnel Administrator
of Massachusetts v. Feeney.3 Suddenly the discriminatory motive test of a
multifactored universe was transmogrified into the world of the binary choice.
Justice Stewart asserted for the Court: "Discriminatory intent is simply not
amenable to calibration. It either is a factor that has influenced the legislative
choice or it is not." 4 The Court conceded in Feeney that the law which gave
veterans an absolute preference was not neutral by design. The law was not
specifically aimed ,at women, however, and it hurt lots of men. Therefore,
the merit selection technique-which guaranteed for all practical purposes
that the plaintiff, who consistently scored high on civil service examinations,
would never get jobs for which she tested-was held not to be an invidious
discrimination. The Court refused to get involved. It would not consider the
historical exclusion of "women's work" jobs from the Massachusetts statu-
tory scheme. The foreclosing of veteran status to women through the sex
classification system of the federal military was beyond the scope of the case.
The chance that the Massachusetts system might "give the veteran more than
a square deal ' 8 6 was not of constitutional moment. The Court remained
neutral, far above the battle between women and veterans for the fixed pie of
government employment.
As argued convincingly a decade ago by John Ely and Paul Brest, and as
refined in more recent scholarship,87 it makes sense that the Court should
inquire as to discriminatory motive in official action. Discriminatory motive
when discovered should be a sufficient basis for invalidation of the challenged
governmental action. The plurality in Bolden, however, elevates the discrimi-
natory motive search into a quixotic quest. It does this, ironically, in the
context of the vote, and the claim by black citizens to have their role in the
choice of representatives reinforced by resort to constitutional law. This is the
realm in which Ely persuasively argues motive analysis is least appropriate.88
83. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
84. Id. at 277.
85. Id. at 275. This factor of spreading the harm was central to the concurrence of Justices White and
Stevens. Id. at 281.
86. Id. at 280-81.
87. See Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive,
1971 SUP. CT. REV. 95; Ely. Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J.
1205 (1970); Symposium, Legislative Motivation, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 925 (1978); and, particularly, Simon,
Racially Prejudiced Governmental Actions: A Motivation Theory of the Constitutional Ban Against Racial
Discrimination, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1041 (1978).
88. Ely, The Centrality and Limits of Motivation Analysis, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1155, 1160-61 (1978),
quoted by Justice Marshall in his Bolden dissent, 100 S. Ct. 1519, 1529 n.21. (1980). Justice Marshall also
assembles an impressive array of empirical studies to the effect that multi-member districting greatly enhances
the ability of the majority to elect all the representatives of the district. Id. at 1520-21 n.3. James Madison in
particular, and the members of the Constitutional Convention in general, spent a good deal of time discussing
the implication of their awareness concerning the direct relationship between size and representation in gover-
ment. My colleague, John Leubsdorf, suggests that there may be particular features of urban politics-for
example. nonpartisan election and no external voters with whom to bargain-that exacerbate the difficulties for
minorities who are excluded by something like racial bloc voting, as found in Mobile. The Fifth Circuit termed
this problem to be one of "'majoritarian monopoly," Wallace v. House, 515 F.2d 619, 627 (5th Cir. 1975),
vacated and remanded, 425 U.S. 947 (1976).
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Though propounded in the name of sensitivity to local authority, a rigid ap-
proach to discriminatory motive compels plaintiffs to file interrogatories and
to seek witness-stand confessions from the town fathers and mothers as to
their specific reasons89 for a particular course of action undertaken "at least in
part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifi-
able group."
The basis for this discriminatory motive approach appears to be a bizarre
combination of purported neutralities. Across a wide and broadening front,
the Court proclaims neutrality as the greatest good for government. From first
amendment theory through equal protection analysis, some sort of benevolent
neutrality is constitutionally compelled. 90 Simultaneously, the Court has come
to view itself as something of a benignly neglectful neutral functionary, high
above the real life battle. The exclusive focus on "a given case" to resolve
what Justice Stewart terms "the ultimate question" of discriminatory motive
is a thin covering for constitutional satisfaction with what already is in place.
This is preeminently so in any challenge to the existing political system.
Politicians are notorious for their close scrutiny of how any change might
affect the allocation of power. They display scrupulous concern for whose ox
is gored in any realignment of existing arrangements. It is this reality which
makes the recent constitutionalization of the two-party system appalling.9'
That elected officials consider and appeal to distinct racial and ethnic groups
has been obvious throughout our history. In Bolden, however, enthusiastic
deference to the institutional status quo is combined with an unwillingness to
contemplate past wrongs. The neutrality which results rests on policy rather
than on history. Strict construction of a bad motive test derived from Wash-
ington v. Davis transforms that decision's defensible constitutional innova-
tion into a dangerous doctrinal straitjacket. It is as if Holmes' insight about
the bad man as the focus of the common law were transformed into the
necessary trigger for constitutional adjudication of racial claims.
The Court may believe that its repeated assertions of neutrality them-
selves constitute a neutral principle. But there is no principle in an approach
which insulates past wrongs from constitutional scrutiny if they are big
enough and last for a long enough time. Neutral principles may be enjoying a
minor renaissance, 92 but they remain something everybody talks about but
89. See, e.g., KarstThe Costs of Motive-Centered Inquiry, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1163 (1978).
90. See note 34 supra. See also Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 100 S. Ct. 2271, 2278-79 (1980) ("Evenhandedness"
principle supports giving state same treatment as would be accorded private businesses in allowing priority for
state citizens); Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602-04 (1979) ("neutral principles of law" approach approved for
resolution of church property dispute following schism); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,676 (1970) (church
property tax exemption upheld as "benevolent neutrality" by government, based upon historic tradition).
91. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Storer v. Brown 415 U.S. 724 (1974); American Party of
Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974). But see Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
92. See Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 982 (1978).
Actually, Professor Greenawalt's defense concedes away most, if not all, of the original claims made for neutral
principles. Id. at 992, 1006-13. Max Weber suggested the general hunger for consistency and generality in law
long before Herbert Wechsler frightened everyone by pointing out that consistency and generality were not to
be found in the most significant decisions of the period. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitu-
tional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). It has never been clear how one would know a neutral principle when
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nobody seems able to do anything about. As hortatory statements about
judicial workmanship, neutral principles are probably toothless. As constitu-
tional doctrine, neutral principles turn out, paradoxically, to be akin to the
colors black and white. We think we see them, but we never actually do. 93 As
seeing is believing, believing is seeing. But neutral principles become a pas-
sive vise, which can squeeze all constitutional claims to extinction, when they
are used to override history and to ignore present day reality.
There is a further anomaly in the current Court's suspicion about the
appropriate role for numbers in constitutional analysis, which coincides with
increasing demands for generality and consistency in the law. It used to be the
case that, in claims of racial discrimination, "statistics often tell much and
courts listen."-94 Jury cases, once the statistical archetype, are now generally
cited for their restrictive language-i.e., the individual defendant has no right
to a specific jury array-rather than for their close scrutiny of any statistically
unequal process that allowed the opportunity to discriminate. 95 Recent criti-
cism by the Justices of "naked statistical evidence, ' 96 and even of "the
numerology" of one of the Brethren 97 signals that the current Court wants to
be able to find an individual perpetrator to blame before it will concede that
the Constitution permits judicial intervention.98 The Court goes nearly to the
opposite extreme, however, when the Justices believe they can point at Con-
gress to escape the heat generated by nonneutrality. "Built-in headwinds," 99
one saw it. Cf. Miller & Howell, The M.vth of Neutrality in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 661
(1960).
93. Like absolute zero, which is unachievable, we never really see black (the total absence of color) nor
white (the presence of the entire spectrum of colors). See N.Y. Times, §C-I, col. 1, January 15, 1980. Things are
as clear as black and white only to a degree. Compare Ladd-Franklin, The Uniqueness of the Blackness
Sensation, in COLOUR AND COLOUR THEORIES 211-12 (1929), (reissued 1973), with Neifeld, The Ladd-
Franklin Theory of the Black Sensation, id. at 241-46. See also Browne, 'The Absolute Truth-And Other
Ambiguities," N.Y. Times, April 8, 1980, § C, at 3, col. I.
94. Alabama v. United States, 304 F.2d 583, 586 (5th Cir. 1962), affdper curiam, 371 U.S. 37 (1962). See,
e.g., Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972); Carter v. Jury Comm'n of Greene County, 3% U.S. 320
(1970). But see Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1%5). One recent decision which appears to fit the old pattern
is Castaneda v. Partida. 430 U.S. 482 (1977). The peculiar fact pattern, the narrowness of the majority vote, and
the vehemence ofthe dissent make Castaneda appear to be somewhat unusual. It is interesting that, in apparent
contrast with their views on voting patterns, Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger assume in
their dissent in Castaneda that "'the premise that underlies the cases recognizing that the criminal defendant has
a personal right under the Fourteenth Amendment not to have members of his own class excluded from jury
service" is "'t]hat individuals are more likely to discriminate in favor of, than against, those who share their
own identifiable attributes." Id. at 515. These three Justices apparently either reject a similar premise of racial
identification in the political context, or they regard it as constitutionally insignificant when they join in the
plurality opinion in Bolden.
95. Jury cases remain distinct. The Court may have particular solicitude for the appearance of fairness in
the judicial fact-finding process. Holmes similarly appeared to distinguish deference to political and economic
realities, as in Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903), and in his dissent in Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 231, 245
(1911) (would uphold peonage scheme as within Alabama's power to regulate contracts), from aggressive
intervention when he believed the judicial process was threatened. See, e.g., Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86
(1923); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 345 (1915)(dissenting opinion).
96. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 548 (1972). See also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
97. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 246 (1977)(Powell, J., dissenting with Burger, C. J. and Rehnquist, J.).
98. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimnation Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of
Suprete Court Decisions, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1052-57 (1978).
99. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). Fora similar approach in the context of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, see the unanimous opinion written by Justice Harlan in Gaston County v. United States, 395
U.S. 285 (1969).
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL
demonstrated via statistics, afford sufficient evidence for judicial activism
based on statutory authorization. But built-in hurricanes, demonstrated sta-
tistically, will not suffice in constitutional analysis. Perhaps it was the regres-
sion analysis used in Bolden, and relied upon by the lower courts as part of the
"aggregate proof' of discriminatory motive in Mobile, that most frightened
the Justices.
It is more probable that their reaction was against the conclusion of the
lower court judges that purposeful inaction"'o by state and local author-
ities-in the face of a pattern of past racial discrimination and its powerful
continuing effects-could constitute sufficient discriminatory motive to meet
the requirement of Washington v. Davis. The general orientation towards
acceptance of whatever is already in place by the current Justices, whose
average age makes this the third oldest Court ever, 0' helps to explain the de-
lights of a neutral approach to the world as it passes below their Olympian
porch.
The Court exacerbates the problem with its glib response to the perplex-
ing philosopher's problem of how to evaluate omissions in comparison to
acts.'0 2 For the current Court, only bad actions count. The failure to act-
"the arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness" 13-is constitutionally irrelevant, a
relic of an earlier age. Only when the Court can identify a culprit, and then
apparently only by proof akin to that required in a criminal context, will
constitutional scrutiny be triggered. The lower courts believed it significant
that those in control in Mobile failed to act, though they were aware of the
problem of inequality in voting. They also emphasized what was at best only an
unarticulated interest that Alabama and Mobile could assert in defense of the
particular existing electoral scheme. '4 In rejecting the aggregate approach,
and the relevance of inaction, the plurality in effect limited the constitutional
inquiry to a search for a smoking gun.
Consensus constitutionalism is the order of the day. The system works.
Time will heal wounds and reward those who wait. In the long run, the victims
of past discrimination are absorbed and should be contented. This is the land
100. 423 F. Supp. 384, 389-92, 398 (S.D. Ala. 1976); 571 F.2d 238, 246 (5th Cir. 1978).
101. See Blaustein & Mersky, Average Age and Length of Service, Chart 111, in The Statistics of the
Sttpreme Court, in IV FRIEDMAN & ISRAEL, THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
(1969). The current Court is moving up quickly on the "Nine Old Men" of the mid-1930s and the Taney Court on
the eve of the Civil War.
102. See, e.g., C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 19, 51-2, 201-07 (1978). and sources cited therein.
103. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401,497 (D.D.C. 1967), affd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d
175 (D.C.Cir. 1969),fitrther relief ordered, 320 F. Supp. 409 (1970), 320 F. Supp. 720 (1970), 327 F. Supp. 844
(1971), order denying plaintiffs* motion to hold the defendants in contempt, No. 82-66 (D.D.C. February 17,
1973). For a critical analysis, see D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 106-170 (1977).
104. The lower courts found Alabama to be without any particular reason for a preference among different
forms of municipal government. See 423 F. Supp. 384, 393 (S.D. Ala. 1976) ("There is no clear cut State policy
either for or against multi-member districting or at-large elections in the State of Alabama, considered as a
whole .... [Mlanifest policy of the City of Mobile has been to have at-large or multi-member districts"); 571
F.2d 238, 246 (5th Cir. 1978) (district court's findings not clearly erroneous and conclusion of vote dilution
"amply supported by its findings.")
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of equal opportunity; since we all get a fair start, the Court must merely
assure that the race of life is fairly run.
The powerful union of the Ahistorical Stance and the Neutral Pose,
demonstrated in the plurality opinion in Bolden, suggests that John Ely's
representation-reinforcing theory has become much more hopeful than de-
scriptive. Bolden also suggests that the current Court has little theoretical
sense of what it is about or when and why it should intervene. The Court finds
it easy to strip cases of their "voting rights attire."'°5 Without a theory but
with a complacent faith in virtual representation and general fair play, the
Court surrenders us to the harsh realities of Casablanca or the Cosmos. The
denouement may be tragic; but the Court appears content, so long as it can
avoid a Happy Ending which is not fully explained.
C. The Unexplained Happy Ending
The answer to tire question is
the question is tire answer, too. 106
The Court in Bolden is scrupulous to avoid an ending which lacks a fully
developed theoretical explanation. Fearful of the slippery slope once the no-
tion of political claims by minority groups is loosed on the constitutional
landscape, the plurality mischaracterizes Justice Marshall's dissent as a plea
for "a constitutional guarantee of proportional representation." 10 7 In the
absence of a full-blown theory akin to the elusive and mythical neutral
principle, a majority of the Court equates blacks with all other potential group
claimants for purposes of constitutional analysis of their claim to political
equality.
Since the Court lacks a technique to discover who is worst off-there is
no constitutional equivalent to the applause meter on the old "Queen For A
Day" program-the Justices seem compelled to assume that we are all
equally well off. This avoidance technique allows the Court to transcend the
muddle of equal protection decisions about who should receive the constitu-
tional means to be transported out of the world of deference to the powers-
that-are, and into the charmed circle of constitutional rights that should be.
Albert Einstein once said, "It is the theory which tells us what we can
observe."'03 A paradox of relativity lurks within this insight. We need a
theory, but we also must be able to see. It will not do to assume that the
constitutional task is simply to treat those similarly situated the same way.,°9
The question of who is in fact similar is very much a function of what lens we
105. Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 70 (1978).
106. Lines from a song heard at a 1972 bluegrass concert in Vermont.
107. 100 S. Ct. 1490, 1506 (1980).
108. Einstein is quoted in D. BELL, COMING OF THE POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 9 (1973).
109. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 780 (1977)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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use. "° The crux of the Court's failure in Bolden lies in its assumption that a
complete theory is both necessary and sufficient for constitutional interven-
tion by the Court.
Such an approach would preclude the results reached in Browvn v. Board
of Education,"' Shelley v. Kraemer,112 and Smith v. Allwright, "3 to cite but a
few examples. We never have found out precisely what the right and its
implications were in Brown, or where they come from-although apparently
members of school boards in Ohio should have known in 1954 that whatever
right it was, its discovery tolled for them. 114 If the Court will not get involved
when cases include "unknown and perhaps unknowable factors,"" 5 and if the
Court believes inertia is properly embraced if the theories presented to it are
incomplete and relativistic, then we are simply remanded to the powerful and
the wealthy and to a feckless struggle to survive.
It is the task of the constitutional law professoriate to supply the tentative
theories and to point to the realities. We do so though we know it is romance
we are writing. That we cannot explain single causation or supply the conclu-
sive proper ending does not undermine our ability to distinguish between what
works and what does not, what makes sense and what is nonsense.
For example, it is not possible to claim that "Casablanca" has the right
ending. But we do know that "it would be wrong" if Rick fell in love with
Laszlo and the two of them took off together, leaving Ilsa to find her moorings
on the Casablanca tarmac. It is also obvious that the ending would not be right
if we discovered that the Nazis had called ahead to the control tower before
they rushed to the airport, so that no one escaped Casablanca.
In constitutional law, the professoriate indulges in an activity akin to that
of the mainstream of recent literary criticism, by which I do not mean decon-
struction, despite appearances to the contrary. We practice hermeneutics
without a license. For example, we do not have and are not given a general
theory by the text of the first amendment; but we have the invaluable work of
the likes of Professors Chafee and Emerson, Blasi and Baker to move us
toward understanding. Professors tenBroek, Black, Ely, Brest, Wasserstrom,
Karst, Fiss, Perry, and O'Fallon are but a few of the scholars who have
advanced our awareness of why a Court should attach an antidiscrimination
finale to its opinions.
I suggest a particular theory, grounded in constitutional language and
history, that I believe supplies the best explanation for the ending lacking in
110. The opticians and optometrists, for example, have expended great time and litigation expense, only to
prove the point. See. e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). Cf.. Friedman v. Rogers, 440
U.S. I (1979). See generally the works of Walker Percy, both novelistic and philosophical, concerning lenses
and perceptions, and the discussion of Percy's work in R. COLES, WALKER PERCY: AN AMERICAN SEARCH
(1978).
III. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
112. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
113. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
114. See notes 60-61 supra.
115. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 756 n.2 (1974)(Stewart, J., concurring).
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Bolden. It is based on the fifteenth amendment. One can invoke the ghost of
Justice Black, and his strict attention to text, to maintain that the fifteenth
amendment has a great deal to say about black citizens and the franchise. The
message was not "wholly negative," despite what Justice Stewart says.
The fifteenth amendment affirmatively proclaimed a right to vote, free of
denial or abridgement based on race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
The protection announced in the constitutional text applies to both the federal
and state governments. The language of the amendment, particularly its decla-
ration that the right to vote "shall not be denied or abridged," implies more
than a shield against discrimination. It suggests an affirmative guarantee. That
amendment was the culmination of a grand scheme, intended by the post-Civil
War Congress to alter the constitutional order and to assure the humanitarian
and political fruits of the bloody victory. 1 6 The details were not completely
thought out and the ramifications were not entirely grasped. But men of the
early Reconstruction Congresses intended to use law as an active agent of
liberation. After initial hesitation, they sought to constitutionalize freedom to
include a constitutional obligation to protect equality in the franchise.
As a matter of the ordinary meaning of language, today and a century
ago, "'abridgement" of a right implies the prior and complete existence of that
right. We certainly use such logic with reference to the first amendment's ban
on "abridging the freedom of speech." The difference between the two
amendments is in the presumption that a right to free speech exists unless and
until the government acts. The franchise is of a different nature. The right to
vote depends upon a reciprocal relationship of the individual to his or her
government. The importance of reciprocity, and the mutuality of allegiance
and affirmative protection, were basic concepts in the political theory of the
immediate post-Civil War period."17 It is as clear as anything can be about the
murky, dramatic, and confused time that the fifteenth amendment was pri-
marily an attempt to constitutionalize the protection of the rights of blacks to
vote freely and equally with whites.
The men of the Reconstruction Congresses, and the varied ratifiers of the
amendments they proposed, may well have had self-centered political and
economic ambitions in addition to benign notions of conserving and building
upon their military victory." 8 But by the time the fifteenth amendment was
116. See generally Soifer. Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV.
651 (1979). See, e.g., U.S. v. Given, 25 F. Cas. 1324 (D. Del. 1873) (No. 15,210); U.S. v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79
(S.D. Alabama 1871) (No. 15,282).
117. Soifer. supra note 116, at 700-06. It was thought particularly important that blacks had fought and died
with valor in the Union cause. For this allegiance they were owed a right to vote, as even a moderate such as
Abraham Lincoln claimed for black veterans in Louisiana in his last public address. See 14. HYMAN, A MORE
PERFECT UNION 281 (2d ed. 1975). Cf. Berger, The Fourteenth Amendment: Light from the Fifteenth, 74 NW.
U.L. REV. 311 (1979).
118. Compare W. GILLETTE, THE RIGHT TO VOTE (1969) with Cox & Cox, Negro Suffrage and Republi-
can Politics: The Problem of Motication in Reconstruction Historiography, 33 J. So. HIST. 303 (1967). See
generally W. GILLETTE, RETREAT FROM RECONSTRUCTION 1869-1879 (1979); H. HYMAN, A MORE
PERFECT UNION (2d ed. 1975).
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ratified in 1870, it was clear that initial Northern opposition to full black
equality in the franchise had been overcome. The ideal was that every male
citizen would have equal political power with his vote. That hope may have
betrayed painful naivet6 about what we now take to be elementary realities of
political science. Nevertheless, the imprecise but important aspiration of the
time was that racial factors should no longer interfere with equal political
power.
My view of the fifteenth amendment complements John Ely's suggestion
about a combination of the guarantee clause of article IV with the equal
protection clause. 19 Details of the symmetry I perceive, through differentia-
tion of fifteenth amendment analysis from fourteenth amendment precedents,
are beyond the scope of this essay. Discussion of a parallel interpretation of
the nineteenth amendment, with results possibly somewhat different from
those in Ely's approach to sex discrimination, is similarly unnecessary here.
My argument does suggest that Jesse Choper was premature in his
declaration that the promise of the fifteenth amendment has been fulfilled., 20 I
do not claim that black citizens should always win when they claim voting
dilution or discrimination. Nor do I assert that the Justices should follow the
election returns to the extent that they transform the impact of the black vote
in presidential elections, or in urban areas for that matter, into a general
theory of practical disenfranchisement.' 2' Rather, as the Court itself recently
noted, the determination of whether a minority group has been excluded from
effective electoral participation involves "a blend of history and an intensely
local appraisal of the design and impact of the [electoral scheme] in the light of
past and present reality, political and otherwise." 122 It was just such a practi-
cal, historical, and cumulative approach that the lower courts adopted in
Bolden.
My suggestion is that the Reconstruction Amendments together pose such
a constitutional test. They impose an affirmative duty on a political system to
guarantee access and responsiveness to racial minorities.
119. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 116-25 (1980).
120. J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 89 (1980).
121. See, e.g., Aberbach, Power Consciousness: A Comparative Analysis, 71 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1544
(1977); Danigelis, Black Political Participation in the United States: Some Recent Evidence, 43 AM. SOC. REV.
756 (1978); Hamilton, Voter Registration Drives and Turnout: A Report on the Harlem Electorate. 92 POL. SCI.
Q. 43 (1977). Goldberg, Vote More, Get More?, N.Y. Times, June 20, 1979, § A, at 23, Col. I. But see
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COMPLACENCY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The framers and ratifiers of the fifteenth amendment did not intend to
leave its guarantee entirely up to Congress to enforce. The sweep of congres-
sional authority does not preempt judicial power and responsibility. In a
properly presented case, the Court has an affirmative obligation since the
enforcement clauses of the Civil War amendments were not intended to re-
place judicial review.'2 That an electoral scheme has been in place for a long
time does not constitute a rationale sufficient to ignore its practical effect and
its historical context.
In Bolden, practicality and the burden of history indicate that the political
system of Mobile has continued much of the tone and the effects of past,
pervasive racial discrimination. The black citizens of Mobile have not yet
achieved the equality in the franchise they were guaranteed by the promise of
the fifteenth amendment. The ordinary coalition-building and shifting factions
of politics-as-usual, which tend to be the essence of our democratic theory,
has been found to have failed consistently to represent and to respond to the
black citizens of Mobile. As targets of a long-term pattern of racial discrimina-
tion, their claim is not like that of any general interest group. It does not open
the floodgates of proportional representation. The fifteenth amendment
speaks to their predicament. It disallows permanent political powerlessness
on a racial basis. Its message should be heeded.
The constitutional revolution of the Second Constitution was tragically
short-lived, and the Court played a significant part in that tragedy. If, for lack
of a Complete Theory, the present Court shies away from happy endings
altogether, the wages of past sins will be fearfully compounded.
We would like to know exactly why Rick put Victor Laszlo and Ilsa on
that plane out of Casablanca, but we also know it is up to us to figure out the
best answer, rather than the answer. The issue merits contemplation, beyond
the glib response that the movie was finished that way, even though we sense
its indeterminacy. It is similarly worthwhile to consider, to create, and to
argue constitutional theory, even after the realists destroyed any hopes of
discovery. We are left largely to our own esthetics, and our existential leaps.
This does not mean that anything and everything goes, of course. Con-
stitutional law demands both craftsmanship and imagination. Text and history
supply the touchstone, but no philosopher's stone. It remains necessary to
so 4
overcome hypertrophy of the critical senses, - the law professor's occupa-
tional disease. Ely and Choper suggest the possibilities. Constitutional law
requires a sense that the way things are, and even the way they were, is not
the way they should be.
To settle for the constitutionalization of the status quo is to bequeath a
petrified forest. It is to fail to do justice in the constitutional quest.
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